| VAOIG REVEALS MANY
PROBLEMS WITH VA'S OUTSOURCED HEALTH CARE
Congressional testimony: VA lacked
reasonable assurance it received the services it paid for, paid
many contractors twice, and more.
by
Larry Scott, VA Watchdog dot Org
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Statement of Belinda J.
Finn Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations
Office of Inspector General Department of Veterans Affairs
Before the Subcommittee on Health Committee on Veterans’ Affairs
United States House of Representatives Hearing on “Review of the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Contract Health Care:
Project Hero” on February 3, 2010 -- 2/3/2010 |
View Statement/Testimony (PDF)
Much of this testimony (posted
below) is taken from previous VAOIG reports ... here ...
Audit of Veterans Health
Administration Noncompetitive Clinical Sharing Agreements --
Report Number 08-00477-211,
9/29/2008 |
Summary |
Report (PDF)
Audit of Veterans Health
Administration's Non-VA Outpatient Fee Care Program -- Report
Number 08-02901-185, 8/3/2009 |
Summary |
Report (PDF)
What is obvious: When it
comes to much of the outsourced health care the VA buys, it
doesn't know what it's paying for ... and, doesn't have a problem
paying for it twice.
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STATEMENT OF
BELINDA J. FINN
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS
BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HEALTH
COMMITTEE ON
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
HEARING ON
"REVIEW OF THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
CONTRACT HEALTH
CARE: PROJECT HERO"
ON
FEBRUARY 3, 2010
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss our
findings related to how the Veterans Health Administration (VHA)
purchases health care services for veterans from non-VA providers.
I am accompanied by Gary Abe, Director, Seattle Office for Audits
and Evaluations, Office of Inspector General (OIG). As health care
costs continue to increase in VA and elsewhere, ensuring that VA
has strong controls over purchased care activities is a critical
aspect of providing the care veterans need. To address this
concern, over the past 2 years, we have issued two reports— Audit
of Veterans Health Administration Noncompetitive Clinical Sharing
Agreements and
Audit of Veterans Health
Administration’s
Non-VA Outpatient Fee Care Program. In addition, we are
currently reviewing the Inpatient Fee Care Program and FSS
contracts for professional and allied health services; we plan to
issue audit reports on these issues later in FY 2010. To date, our
audits of purchased care have identified significant weaknesses
and inefficiencies. Specifically, we have found that VHA has not
established effective policies and procedures to oversee and
monitor services provided by non-VA providers to ensure they are
necessary, timely, high quality, and properly billed.
BACKGROUND
When we initiated our audits
in fiscal year (FY) 2008, VHA’s medical care budget totaled
approximately $39 billion. In FY 2009, the medical care budget
increased to about $44 billion. We estimate that of this amount,
VHA spent about $5.3 billion (12 percent) to purchase health care
services from non-VA entities such as other government agencies;
affiliated universities; community hospitals; nursing homes; and
individual providers. VHA uses various mechanisms to purchase
health care services, including sharing agreements with affiliated
universities and the Department of Defense, Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) contracts, the Non-VA Fee Care Program, Project
HERO, and the Foreign Medical Program. According to VHA managers,
the authority to purchase services from non-VA sources helps to
improve veterans’ access to needed health care services, in
particular specialty care that may not be available at VA medical
centers (VAMCs) or that VAMCs have a difficult time recruiting and
retaining specialists to provide.
Audit of Noncompetitive
Clinical Sharing Agreements
Title 38 of the United States
Code (USC), Section 8153, authorizes VA to enter into
noncompetitive sharing agreements with affiliated institutions and
entities associated with these institutions. In practice, many
sharing agreements are ones in which VA buys specialized clinical
services, such as anesthesiologists or cardiac surgeons, from
affiliated medical schools, university hospitals, clinical
departments, and associated medical practice groups. These medical
specialists provide services onsite in VAMC operating rooms,
clinics, and inpatient medical wards. When we initiated the audit
in FY 2008, VHA reported having about 670 noncompetitive clinical
sharing agreements valued at $575 million.
Performance monitoring
controls over noncompetitive clinical sharing agreements were not
effective; as a result, VHA lacked reasonable assurance it
received the services it paid for. Our review of 58 high cost
surgical and anesthesiology sharing agreements at 8 randomly
selected VAMCs found that controls over contract performance
monitoring for services provided onsite at the VAMCs under all 58
agreements needed strengthening.
For 34 full-time equivalent employee (FTE)
based agreements, contracting officers’ technical representatives
(COTRs) did not monitor the actual amount of time contractors
worked or whether the hours worked met the FTE levels required by
the agreements. For example, one VAMC paid for 2.0 FTE vascular
surgeons, but our review determined that the time provided by
contract vascular surgeons equated to less than 1.2 FTE. The COTR
acknowledged that while she reviewed the surgeons’ workload, she
did not monitor their time. As a result, the VAMC overpaid
$333,030 for time the vascular surgeons were not at the VAMC.
For 24 procedure-based agreements, COTRs did
not always ensure that all of the services were actually received
or needed and that contractors correctly calculated Medicare-based
charges. For example, at one VAMC, a contractor overcharged $1,022
for 31 procedures because it billed rates
that
were higher than the Medicare rates applicable to the geographical
area. The COTR did not review the charges or verify the accuracy
of the rates prior to certifying payments. If left unmonitored,
even routine procedure billings with low value financial errors
can build over time into significant overpayments.
Because of these weaknesses
in performance monitoring, VAMCs overpaid contractors on 30 (52
percent) of the 58 agreements. Strengthening controls over
performance monitoring would save VHA about $9.5 million annually
or $47.4 million over 5 years.
Specifically, we identified
three areas that required strengthening:
Specify Performance Requirements. The sharing
agreements did not specifically and accurately state performance
requirements for the contractors. Clear performance requirements
tell the COTRs what services will be provided, who will provide
the services, and the rates to be charged.
Improve Oversight of COTRs. Contracting officers
and VHA officials did not adequately oversee COTR activities.
Contracting officers did not provide the COTRs clear guidance
about their monitoring responsibilities, nor did they implement
procedures to routinely review the COTRs’ activities to ensure
they were effective.
Provide Specialized Training to COTRs. COTRs did
not have sufficient training to monitor clinical sharing
agreements. Although most of the COTRs had general contract
monitoring training, they had not received any specialized
training on how to establish effective monitoring systems for
FTE-based and procedure-based clinical sharing agreements. For
example, many of the COTRs were unfamiliar with Medicare-based
charges commonly used in procedure-based agreements.
We made seven recommendations
to strengthen controls over sharing agreement performance
monitoring. The Under Secretary for Health agreed with our
findings and recommendations and provided acceptable
implementation plans to address the recommendations. VHA is still
in the process of implementing the recommendations.
Audit of Non-VA Outpatient
Fee Care Program
Title 38 of the USC, Sections
1703, 1725, and 1728, permits VA to purchase health care services
on a fee-for-service or contract basis when services are
unavailable at VA facilities, when VAMCs cannot provide services
economically due to geographical inaccessibility, or in
emergencies when delays may be hazardous to a veteran’s life or
health. The Non-VA Fee Care Program accounts for the bulk of VHA’s
purchased care spending with estimated FY 2008 expenditures
exceeding $2.6 billion; it is also VA’s fastest growing purchased
care activity. For example, outpatient fee costs have more than
doubled during the 4-year period FY 2005–2008, from $740 million
to $1.6 billion, and in FY 2009, outpatient fee costs were just
under $2 billion.
Our recently issued audit
report focused on the Outpatient Fee Care Program. In FY 2008, 137
VAMCs processed an estimated 3.2 million outpatient fee claims.
These claims were for a wide range of diagnostic and therapeutic
services including visits to primary care physicians, x-rays and
diagnostic imaging procedures, chemotherapy and radiation therapy,
dialysis, physical therapy, and outpatient surgical procedures.
Based on our review of a statistical sample of 800 claims, we
concluded that VHA had not established adequate management
controls and oversight procedures to ensure that claims for
outpatient fee services were accurately paid, justifications for
services were adequately documented, and services were properly
pre-authorized.
VAMCs improperly paid 37 percent of
outpatient fee claims by making duplicate payments, paying
incorrect rates, and making other less frequent payment errors,
such as paying for the wrong quantity of services. As a result, we
estimated that in FY 2008, VAMCs overpaid $225 million and
underpaid $52 million to fee providers, or about $1.13 billion in
overpayments and $260 million in underpayments over 5 years.
For 80 percent of outpatient fee claims we
reviewed VAMCs did not adequately document justifications for use
of outpatient fee care or properly pre-authorize services as
required by VHA policy, thereby increasing the risk of additional
improper payments. However, our audit did not assess or question
the clinical necessity of services.
We concluded that the
improper payments, justifications, and authorizations occurred
because VHA had not established an adequate organizational
structure to support and control the complex, highly
decentralized, and rapidly growing fee program. We identified
three specific areas that required strengthening:
Develop Comprehensive Fee Policies and
Procedures. VHA does not have a centralized source of
comprehensive, clearly written policies and procedures for the Fee
Program. Instead, fee supervisors and staff must rely on an
assortment of resources including the Code of Federal Regulations,
outdated VA policy manuals, and other procedure guides, training
materials, or informal guidance.
Identify Core Competencies and Require Training
for Fee Staff. Because the Fee Program is very complex and
requires significant judgment by fee staff to ensure correct
payments, processing fee claims requires specialized knowledge and
skills, such as understanding medical records, insurance billing
concepts, and medical procedure coding. However, VHA does not
require fee staff or their supervisors to attend initial or
refresher training.
Establish Clear Oversight Responsibilities and
Procedures. Strong oversight of the Fee Program should include
procedures and performance metrics for assessing compliance with
program requirements, conducting risk assessments, assessing
program controls, and monitoring accuracy and quality of claims
processing. However, no one from VHA’s Chief Business Office,
National Fee Program Office, Veterans Integrated Service Networks,
or Compliance and Business Integrity Office is routinely
performing oversight activities of the Fee Program.
We made eight recommendations
to strengthen controls over the Outpatient Fee Care Program. The
Under Secretary for Health agreed with the findings and
recommendations and provided acceptable implementation plans to
address the recommendations. In his response, he also stated that
information technology (IT) gaps were "key drivers in the
erroneous payments" identified by our audit. He pointed out that
fee staff manually process many claims and that few upgrades have
been made to the VistA Fee system in the past 10 years. As part of
our ongoing audit of inpatient fee care, we are examining the
Under Secretary’s concern about IT gaps and assessing the impact
of IT systems on claims processing accuracy and efficiency.
CONCLUSION
While purchasing health care
services from non-VA providers may afford VHA flexibility in terms
of expanded access to care and services that are not readily
available at VAMCs, it also poses a significant risk to VA when
adequate controls are not in place. With non-VA health care costs
of about $4.8 billion in FY 2008 and future costs expected to
increase, VHA needs to strengthen performance monitoring over
clinical sharing agreements and improve controls over claims
processing and the justification and authorization of fee
services. Without adequate controls, VHA lacks reasonable
assurance that it is receiving the services it pays for, that the
services are needed, or that the prices paid for services are
correct. Furthermore, it does not have the information it needs to
assess whether this approach for delivering health care to
veterans is efficient and economical.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss these important issues. We would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittee may have.
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