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VA REPORT: YOUNG, MALE VETERAN SUICIDE AT ALL-TIME
HIGH -- Suicide rates for young male Iraq- and
Afghanistan-
era veterans hit a record high in 2006, the last
year
for which records are available.

We have three pieces of information... first is a
news story... second is the VA press release about their Suicide
Prevention Panel .. and the third is the panel's report.
For more about veterans and suicide, use the VA
Watchdog search engine... click here...
http://www.yourvabenefits.org/sessearc
h.php?q=suicide&op=and
Story here...
http://www.usatoday.co
m/news/military/2008-09-08-Vet-suicides_N.htm
Story below:
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-------------------------
VA report: Male U.S. veteran suicides at
highest in 2006
By Gregg Zoroya, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Suicide rates for young
male Iraq- and Afghanistan-era veterans hit a record high in 2006,
according to statistics to be released Tuesday by the Department of
Veterans Affairs.
In 2006, the last year for which records are available, figures show there
were about 46 suicides per 100,000 male veterans ages 18-29 who use VA
services. That compares with about 20 suicides per 100,000 men of that age
who are not veterans, VA records show.
The statistics accompany the release of a study conducted by a group of
mental health experts appointed by VA Secretary James Peake to investigate
the department's efforts to track and prevent suicides among veterans.
"We've been telling Congress and the (VA) for a long time is that what we
have seen are increasing numbers of mental health issues that have not
been adequately addressed, says Dave Autry, spokesman for the Disabled
American Veterans.
VA records show that 141 veterans who left the military after Sept. 11,
2001, committed suicide between 2002 and 2005. In the one year that
followed, an additional 113 of the Iraq- and Afghanistan-era veterans
killed themselves.
The report did not specify how many of those 113 saw combat. The increase
in the number of suicides can be attributed in part to the rising number
of veterans since 2001.
The overall suicide statistics include veterans who served during the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan but were stationed outside the combat zones.
In
a prepared statement, Peake said the VA will try to cut the number of
suicides by following the recommendations made by the panel he appointed,
which included mental health experts from the Army, Pentagon, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health.
Among the panel's recommendations:
•Design a study that identifies suicide risks among veterans. Peake says
he will produce those results in 30 days.
•Improve suicide screening for veterans with depression or post-traumatic
stress disorder. A pilot system is set to start Oct. 1, the VA says.
•Develop a better understanding of appropriate medications for treating
depression, PTSD and suicidal behavior.
The release of the VA data comes days after the Army said 2008 may be
another record year for suicides among active-duty soldiers. If the trend
continues, it would surpass a record of 115 suicides set in 2007.
The Army reported last week that through August, there have been 62
confirmed suicides and 31 deaths suspected of being suicides.
"If this holds true, suicide rates for the Army will surpass" the U.S.
rate for the general population, an Army news release says.
Lengthy and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan cause
relationship problems, a leading factor in suicides, says Col. Elspeth
Ritchie, an Army psychiatrist.
It's critical to identify soldiers in despair, said Col. Carl Castro, an
Army psychiatrist. "By collecting the numbers (of suicides) we know
exactly where we are at, so we know now what's not working. We've got to
try new things; we've got to get innovative."
-------------------------
VA press release here...
http://www.vawatchdog.org/08/vap08/vap090908-1.htm
Press release below:
-------------------------
VA Suicide Prevention Panel Completes
Draft Report
September 9, 2008
Group Lauds VA’s Comprehensive Strategy
WASHINGTON – A blue-ribbon panel has praised the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) for its “comprehensive strategy” in suicide prevention that
includes a “number of initiatives and innovations that hold great promise
for preventing suicide attempts and completions.”
Among the initiatives and innovations the group studied were VA’s Suicide
Prevention Lifeline – 1-800-273-TALK. The lifeline is staffed by trained
professionals 24 hours a day to deal with any immediate crisis that may be
taking place. Nearly 33,000 veterans, family members or friends of
veterans have called the lifeline in the year that it has been operating.
Of those, there have been more than 1,600 rescues to prevent possible
tragedy.
Other initiatives noted included the hiring of suicide prevention
coordinators at each of VA’s 153 medical facilities, the establishment of
a Mental Health Center of Excellence in Canandaigua, N.Y., focusing on
developing and testing clinical and public health intervention standards
for suicide prevention, the creation of an additional research center on
suicide prevention in Denver, which focuses on research in the clinical
and neurobiological conditions that can lead to increased suicide risk and
a plus-up in staff making more than 400 mental health professionals
entirely dedicated to suicide prevention.
With the praise, the panel also
recommended a mixture of more research, greater cooperation among federal
agencies, and more education for health care workers and community leaders
to further strengthen and share VA’s ability to help veterans and their
families.
“Every human life is precious, none more than the men and women who serve
this nation in the military,” said Secretary of Veterans Affairs Dr. James
B. Peake. “The report of this blue-ribbon panel, and other efforts
underway, will ensure VA mobilizes its full resources to care for our most
vulnerable veterans.”
Called the “Blue Ribbon Work Group on Suicide Prevention,” the five-member
group was composed of suicide prevention experts from VA, the Department
of Defense, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National
Institute of Health, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration. The group was created by Peake and met June 11-13, 2008.
Among the panel’s recommendations to further enhance VA’s outstanding
programs, many of which VA has already begun to implement, are:
* Design a study that will identify suicide risk among veterans of
different conflicts, ages, genders, military branches and other factors.
VA has committed to work with other federal agencies to design such a
study within 30 days.
* Improve VA’s screening for suicide
among veterans with depression or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
VA is in the process of designing a new screening protocol, with pilot
test undertaken during the fiscal year quarter beginning Oct. 1, 2008.
* Ensure that evidence-based research
is used to determine the appropriateness of medications for depression,
PTSD and suicidal behavior. VA’s is providing written warnings to patients
about side effects, and the Department’s suicide prevention coordinators
are contacting health care providers to advise them of the latest
evidence-based research on medications.
* Devise a policy for protecting the
confidential records of VA patients who may also be treated by the
military’s health care system. VA is already developing a plan to clarify
the privacy rights of patients who come to VA while serving in the
military.
* Increase research about suicide
prevention. VA has announced several funding opportunities this year for
research on suicide prevention and is developing priorities for suicide
prevention research.
* Develop educational materials about
suicide prevention for families and community groups. VA is examining the
effectiveness of support groups and educational material for the families
of suicidal veterans, and producing a brochure for the families of
veterans with traumatic brain injury about suicide, which will be
available within 30 days.
* Increase training for VA chaplains
about the warning signs of suicide. VA offices responsible for chaplains
and mental health professionals are studying ways to implement this
recommendation, with a report due by Nov. 1.
* Develop a gun-safety program for
veterans with children in the home, both as a child-safety measure and a
suicide prevention effort. A VA directive establishing the program is
being developed, with full implementation expected during the fiscal year
beginning Oct. 1, 2008.
VA is the nation’s largest provider of mental health care. More than
17,000 mental health professionals, including dedicated suicide prevention
coordinators in each of VA’s 153 medical centers, are available to care
for veterans. The Department’s mental health program this year is funded
at more than $3 billion.
-------------------------
VA panel's report is below... this came to me by
email.
-------------------------
Report of the
BLUE RIBBON WORK GROUP ON SUICIDE PREVENTION
IN THE VETERAN POPULATION
executive summary
The Blue Ribbon Work Group on Suicide Prevention in the Veteran Population
was chartered May 5, 2008, by Secretary of Veterans Affairs James B.
Peake, MD, to provide advice and consultation to him on various matters
relating to research, education, and program improvements relevant to the
prevention of suicide in the veteran population. The Work Group’s report
presents its findings and recommendations to improve relevant VA programs,
with the primary objective of reducing the risk of suicide among veterans.
The Work Group found that the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has
developed a comprehensive strategy to address suicides and suicidal
behavior that includes a number of initiatives and innovations that hold
great promise for preventing suicide attempts and completions. Evaluation
of the impact of these efforts will be of critical importance not only to
promote continuous improvement in VHA’s suicide prevention efforts, but
also to inform suicide prevention efforts across the Nation and reach
veterans who do not utilize VHA services.
The Work Group had eight key findings and recommendations:
Finding 1. Conflicting and inconsistent reporting of veteran suicide rates
were observed across various studies.
Recommendation 1: VHA should establish an analysis and research plan in
collaboration with other Federal agencies to resolve conflicting study
results in order to ensure that there is a consistent approach to
describing the rates of suicide and suicide attempts in veterans.
Finding 2. Suicide screening processes being implemented in VHA primary
care clinics go beyond the current evidence and may have unintended
effects.
Recommendation 2: VA should revise and reevaluate the current policies
regarding mandatory suicide screening assessments.
Finding 3. VA is attempting to systematically provide coordinated,
intensive, enhanced care to veterans identified as being at high risk for
suicide. However, the criteria for being flagged as high risk is not
clearly delineated; nor are criteria for being removed from the high risk
list.
Recommendation 3: Proceed with the planned implementation of the Category
II flag, with consideration given to pilot testing the flag in one or more
regions before full national implementation.
Finding 4. The root cause analyses presented to the Work Group did not
distinguish between suicide deaths, suicide attempts, and self-harming
behavior without intent to die.
Recommendation 4: Ensure that suicides and suicide attempts that are
reported from root cause analyses use definitions consistent with broader
VHA surveillance efforts.
Finding 5. The emphasis of VHA leadership on the use of clozapine and
lithium does not appear to be sufficiently evidence-based.
Recommendation 5: VHA should ensure that specific pharmacotherapy
recommendations related to suicide or suicide behaviors are
evidence-based.
Finding 6. Efforts to improve accurate media coverage and disseminate
universal messages to shift normative behaviors to reduce population
suicide risk behavior are not being fully pursued.
Recommendation 6: VA should continue to pursue opportunities for outreach
to enrolled and eligible veterans, and to disseminate messages to reduce
risk behavior associated with suicidality.
Finding 7. Concerns about confidentiality for OEF/OIF service members
treated at VHA facilities may represent a barrier to mental health care.
Recommendation 7: The issue of confidentiality of health records of
OEF/OIF service members who receive care through VHA should be clarified
both for patient consent-to-care and for general dissemination to Reserve
and Guard service members contemplating utilizing VHA medical system
services to which they are entitled.
Finding 8. The introduction of Suicide Prevention Coordinators (SPCs) at
each VA medical center is a major innovation that holds great promise for
preventing suicide among veterans; however, there is insufficient
information on optimal staffing levels of SPCs.
Recommendation 8: In order to maximize the effectiveness of the Suicide
Prevention Coordinators program, it is recommended that there be ongoing
evaluation of the roles and workloads of the SPC positions.
In addition to the above findings and recommendations, the Work Group
identified 14 other areas for possible action, including adopting a
standard definition for suicide and suicide attempts, implementing a gun
safety program targeting veterans with children in the home, working with
community partners, consolidating suicide prevention activities into a
comprehensive suicide prevention strategic plan, prioritizing research
activities, and other areas for consideration.
BLUE RIBBON WORK GROUP ON SUICIDE PREVENTION
IN THE VETERAN POPULATION
REPORT TO JAMES B. PEAKE, MD, SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
The Blue Ribbon Work Group on Suicide Prevention in the Veteran Population
was chartered May 5, 2008, by Secretary of Veterans Affairs James B.
Peake, MD, to provide advice and consultation to him on various matters
relating to research, education, and program improvements relevant to the
prevention of suicide in the veteran population. This report presents the
findings of the Blue Ribbon Work Group on Suicide Prevention in the
Veteran Population and its recommendations to improve relevant VA
programs, with the primary objective of reducing the risk of suicide among
veterans. As required in its charter, the report is submitted within 15
days of the Work Group’s meeting.
I. Overview, Charter, Participants, and Process
The Blue Ribbon Work Group on Suicide Prevention in the Veteran Population
includes five Executive Branch employees who are experts in public health
mental health programs (including suicide prevention and education
programs), research (including mental health epidemiology and suicidology),
and clinical treatment programs for patients at risk for suicide:
· Colonel (US Army) Charles Hoge, MD – Director, Division of Psychiatry
and Neuroscience, Walter Reed Army lnstitute of Research
· Colonel (US Air Force) Robert Ireland, MD – Chairman, Program Director
for Mental Health Policy, Clinical and Program Policy, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)
· Debra Karch, PhD – Lead Behavioral Scientist, National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control, Division of Violence Prevention, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention
· Richard McKeon, PhD, MPH – Public Health Advisor for Suicide Prevention,
Center for Mental Health Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration
· Jane Pearson, PhD – Associate Director for Preventive Interventions,
Division of Services and Intervention Research, National Institute of
Mental Health
Meeting and Deliberations of the Blue Ribbon Work Group
The deliberations of the Work Group were informed by presentations and the
counsel of a panel of nationally recognized experts (the “Expert Panel”),
as well as by information provided by Veterans Affairs (VA) staff, at a
meeting convened June 11-13, 2008, in Washington, DC (see Appendix A for a
copy of the meeting agenda). The sessions were organized to allow for
questions from the Work Group members and free-flowing discussion to
ensure that the Work Group members could gather the information they
needed to make their recommendations.
Veterans Administration Staff Briefings
Employees of the Department of Veterans Affairs were called upon to
provide background briefings to the Work Group on relevant VA programs,
both to inform their deliberations and to provide a context for
discussions of VA research, education, and program activities.
Presentations were made by the following staff:
· Alfonso Batres, PhD, MA, MSSW – Chief Officer, Readjustment Counseling
Service
· Fred Blow, PhD – Director, National VA Serious Mental Illness Treatment
Research & Evaluation Center (SMITREC); Professor and Research Professor,
Department of Psychiatry, University of Michigan, and Director, Mental
Health Services Outcomes & Translation Section
· Han Kang, DrPH – Director, Environmental Epidemiology
· Ira Katz, MD, PhD - Deputy Chief Patient Care Services Officer for
Mental Health
· Janet Kemp, PhD, RN – VA National Suicide Prevention Coordinator;
Associate Director, Education and Training, Center of Excellence at
Canandaigua
· Kerry Knox, PhD, MS – Director, Center of Excellence at Canandaigua;
Associate Professor, University of Rochester Medical Center, Department of
Psychiatry and Center for the Study and Prevention of Suicide
· Peter Mills, PhD, MS – Director, Field Office, VA National Center for
Patient Safety; Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Dartmouth
Medical School
· Cheryl Oros, PhD – Deputy Director, Clinical Science Research &
Development Service
· Antonette Zeiss, PhD – Deputy Chief, Mental Health Services
In addition to providing general background information about the
organization and structure of VA, program budgets, the numbers of veterans
served, and the epidemiology of suicide and suicide risk among veterans,
staff provided more in-depth presentations regarding the following
programs and activities:
· Patient Safety Program (Mills)
· Findings on users of Veterans Health Administration services (Blow)
· Mental Health Services (Zeiss)
· Veterans Centers and Readjustment Counseling Service (Batres)
· VA Suicide Prevention Services (including Suicide Prevention
Coordinators and the National Suicide Prevention Hotline) (Kemp)
· Suicide Prevention Research and Research Enabling Centers (Knox and Oros)
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) staff provided information about
current programs, challenges to providing services (including
institutional barriers), and suggestions for improving VA programs.
Expert Panel Presentations
The members of the Expert Panel included experts in public health suicide
programs, suicide research, clinical treatment programs for patients, and
other relevant areas. The following individuals were part of the
nine-member Expert Panel:[1]
· Dan Blazer, MD, PhD – Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
Duke University Medical Center
· Gregory Brown, PhD – Research Associate Professor of Clinical Psychology
in Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania
· Martha Bruce, PhD, MPH – Professor of Sociology in Psychiatry, Weill
Cornell Medical College, Cornell University
· Eric Caine, MD – Chair, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Rochester
· Jan Fawcett, MD – Professor of Psychiatry, University of New Mexico
School of Medicine
· Robert Gibbons, PhD – Director, Center for Health Statistics, University
of Illinois at Chicago
· David Jobes, PhD, ABPP – Professor of Psychology, Catholic University of
America
· Mark Kaplan, DrPH – Professor of Community Health, Portland State
University
· Thomas Ten Have, PhD, MPH – Professor of Biostatistics in Biostatistics
and Epidemiology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine
The Expert Panel provided the Work Group with their expert opinion,
interpretation, and conclusions related to the information and data
presented; expert information and data from other (non-VA) sources; and,
recommendations on opportunities to improve VA programs. The Expert Panel
presentations focused on a wide range of topics, including the following:
· Frameworks for preventing suicide among veterans (Caine)
· The epidemiology of suicide among veterans (Blazer)
· Suicide mortality among veterans in the general population (Kaplan)
· The statistics of suicide (ecological data and small area estimation,
access and effectiveness of treatment in VA, what suicide attempts data
mean, the association between decreased suicide risk and antidepressants)
(Gibbons)
· Dealing with the heterogeneity of the data (identifying geographic hot
spots and high risk individuals, etiology versus prediction models) (Ten
Have)
· Assessment and psychosocial interventions (suicide classification
nomenclature efforts, assessment methodologies, evidence-based
psychosocial treatments including Dialectical Behavior Therapy and
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy) (Brown and Jobes)
· Anxiety (PTSD) and mood disorders in suicide, including treatments
(Fawcett)
· Integration of mental health into physical health care (including
through home-based care programs) (Bruce)
Work Group Deliberations
Following the formal presentations, the Work Group members engaged in a
process of discussion and consensus building regarding VA research,
education, programs, and strategies for improvement, soliciting input and
feedback from the Expert Panel and VA staff as necessary. The Work Group
members continued their deliberations after the meeting through a series
of conference calls. The Work Group prepared this report within 15 days of
its meeting, including findings and recommendations for improving VA
suicide programs, to include research, education, and prevention/clinical
programs.
Scope of the Report
As the largest integrated health care system in the United States, the
Veterans Health Administration serves 5.5 million veterans a year out of
the 7.8 million veterans who have qualified for VA health benefits through
income means testing and disability criteria (i.e., enrolled veterans).
This represented approximately 23 percent of the total population of 23.8
million living veterans in 2007 (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs,
2008). In 2007, 210,778 veterans receiving VHA services were veterans of
the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
conflicts. The Work Group deliberated whether its recommendations should
address suicide prevention only for veterans served by VA, or for the
entire population of veterans in the U.S., including those who do not
receive care from VHA or Vet Centers. Because the Department of Veterans
Affairs is perceived by the public, and in particular veterans and active
duty personnel, as the symbol of care for all veterans, VHA carries a
burden to provide accurate information on suicide rates that may go beyond
its legislated mandate. Thus, this Work Group report highlights selected
areas of suicide research and prevention that should potentially focus on
all veterans, regardless of VHA eligibility or health service use. These
include developing estimates of suicide rates for various segments of the
veteran population, as well as opportunities for outreach to increase
service use by eligible veterans.
Similarly, the Work Group also considered how extensive the
recommendations should be, given the rapid evolution of suicide prevention
initiatives. A May 2007 report by the VA Office of Inspector General (OIG)
reviewed the implementation of VHA’s Mental Health Strategic Plan
Initiatives for Suicide Prevention (VA Office of Inspector General, 2007).
The Mental Health Strategic Plan (MHSP), which was finalized in 2004,
includes 10 areas specific to suicide prevention for which the OIG
reviewed the extent of implementation, as well as coordination across
systems (e.g., outreach, screening, tracking, etc.). At the time of the
May 2007 OIG report, many efforts were limited to a Veterans Integrated
Service Network (VISN)-specific level of implementation. At its meeting,
the Work Group heard that system-wide implementation of a number of
efforts has been initiated within the past year. Progress is ongoing in
surveillance, research, program evaluation, patient safety, and quality
improvement efforts by professionals working at a number of different VHA
offices, including the Center for Excellence at Canandaigua; the War
Related Illness and Injury Study Center; the VA National Center for
Patient Safety; the Serious Mental Illness Treatment Research and
Evaluation Center (SMITREC); the Mental Illness Research, Education, and
Clinical Centers (MIRECCs), particularly the Denver MIRECC, which has a
specific focus on suicide; the National Center for PTSD; the Program
Evaluation Resource Center; the Centers of Excellence and Quality
Enhancement Research Initiatives (QUERI); and others. Key sources of data
on suicides and suicidal behaviors include the VA medical centers, VISNs,
and Suicide Prevention Coordinators; the National Death Index; the
National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS); and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System (WISQARS).
This report considers the range of efforts relevant to a comprehensive
suicide prevention strategy for veterans receiving services from VA. This
includes, for example, surveillance of veterans (outreach, screening,
assessment, and tracking of both those eligible for care in VA and those
not eligible), multiple levels of prevention (i.e., universal indicated,
and selected), and plans to implement quality improvement efforts.
Section II highlights strengths of VA programs, and Section III offers
areas for the Secretary to consider for improvement.
II. Summary of Strengths of VHA’s Suicide Prevention Program
The Work Group congratulates VHA for developing a comprehensive strategy
to reduce suicides and suicidal behavior. This strategy includes a number
of initiatives and innovations that hold great promise for preventing
suicide attempts and completions. Evaluation of the impact of these
efforts will be of critical importance not only to promote continuous
improvement in VHA’s suicide prevention efforts, but also to inform
suicide prevention efforts across the Nation. Because the majority of
veterans do not utilize VHA services, significantly reducing the numbers
of suicides among veterans will likely require dissemination of new
knowledge throughout health care systems at large.
The Work Group found that, in its provider role, VHA is optimizing care
through best clinical practices and is exploring additional system-wide
policies to further reduce suicide risk. VA described its basic strategy
as providing ready access to high quality mental health services,
supplemented by programs specifically designed to address suicide. In
order to provide ready access to mental health care, VA has established
standards that go beyond what is typically found in non-VA health care
systems. These include requiring that all patients requesting or being
referred for mental health services receive an initial evaluation within
24 hours and a more comprehensive diagnostic and treatment planning
evaluation within 14 days. Other examples include the requirement that all
VA emergency departments have mental health coverage, and that all
patients discharged from inpatient psychiatric units following
hospitalization are seen within seven days by a provider if a follow-up
appointment is missed. In its intramural research role, there are many
opportunities to further evaluate these best clinical practices, as well
as to consider strategic questions about suicide rates, risk factors, and
long-term outcomes. Indeed, VHA is uniquely positioned to conduct
large-scale prevention and treatment initiatives and ongoing assessments
of the effectiveness of these initiatives. Advantages of conducting such
initiatives through VHA include the availability of population-based data
systems and the capacity for multisite initiatives and research, as well
as the potential for moving toward “real time” surveillance of suicide
deaths and attempts.
The current VA suicide prevention strategy is appropriately part of the
comprehensive VHA MHSP. Although there is no single document that
summarizes the entire suicide prevention effort, all elements of a
comprehensive suicide prevention plan are included in the MHSP. VA suicide
prevention strategy also builds on the National Strategy for Suicide
Prevention (USDHHS, 2001), which calls for improving awareness that
suicide is preventable, and promotes universal, selective, and indicated
approaches to prevention.
VA suicide prevention strategy includes the following key components:
1. Comprehensive surveillance, research, and program evaluation. These
activities include: ongoing surveillance, research, program evaluation,
patient safety, and quality improvement efforts implemented by
professionals working at a number of different VHA offices, including the
Office of Quality and Performance; the National Center for Patient Safety;
the Office of Environmental Epidemiology; the Office of Mental Health
Services (which includes the Center for Excellence at Canandaigua; the
SMITREC; the MIRECCs; the National Center for PTSD; the Northeast Program
Evaluation Resource Center; and other Centers of Excellence); and the
Office of Research and Development (which includes the Quality Enhancement
Research Initiatives and other programs).
2. Education, training, and clinical quality improvement. Activities in
this category include operations and support for continuing education and
training, including health promotion efforts and universal suicide
awareness training for VHA staff members, as well as quality improvement
through monitoring of selected practice outcomes, clinical diagnoses,
number of sessions seen, no-show rates, and other measures that are a part
of standard clinical practice quality monitoring.
3. Suicide Prevention Coordinators (SPCs). Instituting the role of Suicide
Prevention Coordinators at all VA medical facilities is an important part
of the comprehensive suicide prevention program. SPCs have
responsibilities that include community outreach, training VHA personnel,
flagging high risk patients, tracking and monitoring high risk patients,
and participating in patient safety and environmental analyses. SPCs
develop local suicide prevention strategies and also report to VA National
Suicide Prevention Coordinator.
4. Universal, selective, and indicated interventions. VA engages in
multiple levels of suicide prevention that include universal, selective,
and indicated approaches.[2] With regard to universal prevention efforts,
VA leadership directly addresses suicide risk across VA through policies
that facilitate these suicide prevention activities. Outreach at
deployment and reintegration points for OEF and OIF soldiers is an example
of universal prevention.
Similar to people in the community at large, most VA enrollees are more
likely to seek out primary care (and to see primary care providers
routinely) than to seek out specialty care for mental health problems. As
another universal approach, VHA has incorporated mental health
professionals into primary care clinics to improve mental health access,
reduce stigma, and manage co-morbid mental health disorders using
evidence-based collaborative care models.
Screening for suicide risk can be applied both universally, (e.g.,
periodically screening all patients in primary care) as well as part of an
indicated prevention strategy that focuses on those individuals who have
been identified as being at high risk (e.g., suicide attempters). VA has
implemented screening in primary care setting through initial screening
for depression using the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ)-2 or PHQ-9,
and screening for PTSD with the PTSD Checklist (PCL); if these are
positive, clinicians are required to further assess suicide risk; SPCs are
then contacted about high risk patients. The presence of a SPC at each
health care center also encourages increased awareness that suicidality is
a health condition that can be assessed, treated, and tracked to maintain
continuity and quality of care with a VISN. High risk individuals receive
a Category II flag, and SPCs are currently implementing standard
approaches for developing suicide risk safety plans for suicidal
enrollees. These plans offer flexibility to adjust for monitoring and
treatment needs that vary over time and across settings for at-risk
enrollees. Safety plans are being embedded in efforts to implement
evidence-based psychotherapy (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy,
assertive community treatment) and pharmacologic treatments aimed at
reducing mental and substance use disorders that increase suicide risk.
VA National Center for Patient Safety services, using root cause analyses,
provides another indicated preventive function through the assessment of
possible systems factors in deaths by suicide, such as environmental
vulnerabilities or issues in risk communication.
Once identified, efforts to reduce these risk factors (e.g. removing door
hinges that could be used for hanging) are implemented.
Vet Centers excel in providing selective and indicated preventive
interventions through their outreach to identified combat veterans in
distress, as well as to other high risk groups such as homeless or
incarcerated veterans. Vet Centers typically include community networks to
meet the needs of service women who have suffered sexual trauma, and
bereavement support for family members of service members killed in
action.
5. Suicide prevention hotline. Individuals in crisis, or others concerned
about someone’s suicide risk, can access a 24-hour suicide prevention
hotline. In a partnership between VA and the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Administration, all callers to the National Suicide Prevention
Lifeline number (800-273-TALK) hear a prompt stating: “If you are a U.S.
military veteran or are calling about a veteran, please press ‘one’ now.”
Callers who press “1” are then automatically connected to a crisis center
operated by the VA Center of Excellence at Canandaigua in New York. VA
crisis counselors, who are all mental health providers, are able to access
the veteran’s electronic medical record to best facilitate convenient
(e.g., in the veteran’s local community) and appropriate treatment.
Efforts are underway to examine the effectiveness of referrals of VA’s
hotline.
6. New evidence-based clinical treatment modalities. The Work Group was
very impressed with VA’s efforts to incorporate new treatment modalities
into clinical care based on emerging research showing the effectiveness of
cognitive-behavioral therapy interventions that target suicidal ideation
or behavior. Examples of this research include randomized controlled
trials conducted by Brown and his colleagues on cognitive therapy for the
prevention of suicide attempts (Brown, et al., 2005), by Slee and
colleagues on cognitive-behavioral therapy and self-harm (Slee, Garnefski,
van der Leeden, Arensman, & Spinhoven, 2008), and by Linehan and her
colleagues on the effectiveness of dialectical behavioral therapy in
patients with borderline personality disorder (Linehan, et al., 2006).
Several other randomized controlled trials are underway currently by
Brown’s group, Jobes, and others. Additional research is encouraged in
this area, as well as expansion to focus on more chronic patients with
persistent suicidal ideation or behaviors.
III. Findings and Recommendations: Considerations for Improvement
There are several specific areas of concern that were identified during
the two days of panel presentations and later deliberations by the Work
Group that warrant further consideration. These are presented below as
findings and recommendations.
FINDING 1:
Conflicting and inconsistent reporting of veteran suicide rates were
observed across various studies.
Similar to all large-scale suicide prevention efforts, both nationally and
internationally, VA is challenged by inconsistent definitions for the
range of suicidal behaviors (deaths, attempts, ideation). But unlike other
national efforts, the topic of suicide attempts and suicides in veterans
has received high levels of public and media attention, and it is widely
believed that veterans are at higher risk of suicide than non-veterans.
There are numerous problems with suicide rate reporting and a lack of
consistency in the message that the pubic hears about the risk of suicides
in veterans and the potential factors that may elevate (or reduce) this
risk. As Dr. Blazer pointed out in his presentation to the Work Group
titled “Runaway Numbers,” news stories often report only numerator data
(i.e., the number of suicides or attempts). When denominators or rates are
presented, there is frequently a lack of clarity about what they mean. The
public assumes that deployment and war-related experiences are the
principle reason for higher rates of suicide in veterans, yet numerous
studies by Dr. Kang’s research group actually show that in prior
conflicts, there was no increased risk associated with deployment to a war
zone (e.g., Kang & Bullman, 2001; Michalek, Ketchum, & Akhtar, 1998;
Watanabe, Kang, & Thomas, 1991). Differences in reporting and lack of
clarity of numbers have resulted in public misunderstanding about the past
and current scope of suicide risk for all veterans, as well as various
subgroups of veterans.
Published peer-reviewed studies and other official sources of data are the
principal sources of conflicting or inconsistent results on veteran
suicides, including those reported by news organizations. There are a
number of studies by Dr. Kang’s group and others that have indicated that
veterans who deployed to Vietnam, Gulf War 1, and OEF/OIF have not had
significantly higher rates of suicide compared with era veterans who did
not deploy, and in some cases also compared with the general population. A
notable exception is veterans with medical conditions, such as PTSD or a
history of being wounded (see, e.g., Bullman & Kang, 1994; 1996). Studies
have also consistently shown that rates of suicide among active duty
military personnel are lower than demographically adjusted civilian
populations (e.g., Eaton, Messer, Wilson, & Hoge, 2006). In aggregate,
these studies indicate that veterans who deployed to combat zones are not
at greater risk of suicide than era veterans who did not deploy, and that
active duty service members represent a healthier segment of the
population. Dr. Kang, in his briefing to the Work Group on June 11, 2008,
stated that, “The risk of suicide among war veterans, as a whole, is not
significantly higher than non-deployed veterans or than the comparable
U.S. general population.”
On the other hand, several studies and official sources of data have shown
that rates of suicide in all veterans are higher than in non-veterans.
Secretary Peake, in his testimony before the House Veterans Affairs
Committee on May 6, 2008, reported that veterans had higher rates of
suicide than the general U.S. population based on 2005 NVDRS data
collected from 16 states,[3] with the greatest differences between
veterans and general population observed in the younger age groups. For
example, male veterans ages 18-29 had a suicide rate of 44.99 per 100,000
in 2005 compared with 20.36 for general population males in that age
group; the rate was 31.52 versus 30.51 per 100,000 for men age 65 and
above. Veterans who used VA services had higher rates than other veterans.
National rates for 2005 reported through the CDC WISQARS that were noted
in material presented to the Work Group showed different rates, but in a
similar direction: Male veterans aged 18-29 had a rate of 26.94 per
100,000, compared with 19.35 for general population males of that age
group; the rates were 34.27 versus 29.53 for age 65 and above. A study by
Mark Kaplan and his colleagues that linked National Health Interview
Survey data from 1986-1994 with National Death Index (NDI) data from
1986-1997 showed that veterans were twice as likely to die of suicide than
non-veterans (Kaplan, Huguet, McFarland, & Newsom, 2007). During his
presentation, Dr. Kaplan stated to the Work Group, “Regardless of the era
of service, veterans are more than twice as likely to end their lives
compared to persons who had not served in the Armed Forces.” Numerous
studies have shown the strong association of suicide with medical
problems, particularly mental health problems, but also a history of being
wounded and medical co-morbidity. Evidence also indicates that veterans
are more likely to use firearms as a means of suicide than non-veterans.
These studies provide a very confusing picture of the risk of suicide
among veterans, particularly from the perspective of the public, and there
is clearly a need to resolve the differences. One of the fundamental
questions is why veterans would have a higher risk of suicide in the first
place, given that virtually every study of active duty populations
demonstrates that rates are lower in service members than in civilian
populations (e.g., because of the “healthy worker effect”). During the
meeting, it was mentioned that veterans may become less healthy or develop
a higher risk of suicide as they age compared with demographically matched
non-veteran aging populations. However, this is unproven, and the
assumptions underlying this should be analyzed. It cannot be assumed that
two populations with different levels of health at one point in time would
show an opposite relationship as they age. In addition, if deployment to a
combat zone is not associated with increased risk of suicide (as Dr.
Kang’s studies indicate), what is the reason for higher rates among all
veterans?
Based on the above considerations, it seems very likely that there are
explanations for the rate inconsistencies that have not been sufficiently
evaluated to date. These include:
1. Biases related to the way in which veteran status is ascertained on
death records. Studies that rely on death certificates and other death
records, such as NVDRS, identify veteran status by a single question that
asks whether or not the person had ever served in the U.S. Armed Forces.
This is generally completed by funeral directors, who may obtain this
information from next of kin.
In addition to concerns about accuracy, the general nature of this
question means that anyone who has ever served in the Armed Forces, even
for just a day (and thus are not eligible for benefits), can be identified
as a “veteran.” Every year, however, there are thousands of service
members who fail to complete basic or advanced training or who leave the
military due to problems such as misconduct, personality disorders, legal
problems, adjustment reactions, alcohol and drug-related problems, and
other administrative reasons for discharge. Attrition prior to completing
the first term of enlistment has been as high as 30 percent in some years.
Thus, it is likely that a significant percentage of persons identified on
death records as a “veteran” fall into one of these categories. These
individuals would be more likely to have risk factors for suicide, which
would drive the rate of suicides up in NVDRS samples compared with other
samples of veterans who are eligible for VA benefits. In addition,
ascertainment of veteran status appears to differ somewhat between death
records (numerator) and U.S. Census (denominator) data. For example,
although individuals who trained in the Reserve Component but did not
serve on active duty should not be counted as veterans in the U.S. Census
figures, they may be counted on death records; this would also have the
effect of increasing the apparent suicide rate in veterans.
2. Misclassification biases. The second likely reason for differences in
rates across studies is misclassification biases. In the study presented
by Dr. Kaplan, suicide accounted for a higher proportion of total deaths
in veterans, but “other external causes” of death (accidents and
homicides) accounted for a much higher proportion of deaths in
non-veterans than in veterans (8 percent vs. 4.6 percent respectively).
Dr. Kaplan also stated that undetermined deaths were higher in
non-veterans than in veterans. This suggests that there may be
classification biases that account for the apparently higher rates in
veterans. There are several possible reasons for misclassification biases:
· Veteran suicides may be more likely to be correctly classified than
suicides occurring in non-veterans because of the higher use of firearms
by veterans. Self-inflicted firearm deaths are more likely to be
classified as suicides than self-inflicted deaths due to other mechanisms,
such as overdoses. Since overdoses account for a high proportion of
undetermined deaths, it may be that non-veteran suicides are more likely
to be misclassified as an undetermined cause, whereas suicides in veterans
(who more often use firearms) are more likely to be correctly classified.
· Misclassification biases identified in active duty military samples
illustrate the way in which these biases can affect conclusions about
suicide rates. There is direct evidence of classification biases of
suicides in active duty military service members (e.g., Car, Hoge,
Gardner, & Potter, 2004; Eaton, et al., 2006), and it is important to note
that active duty military members will also likely be identified as
“veterans” on death records. The study by Eaton, et al. (2006), based on
an analysis of all suicides in active duty military personnel from 1999 to
2000, demonstrated that deaths in Navy service members were more likely to
be classified as an “undetermined” cause compared with other services, and
thus produce lower official rates of suicide. The most likely explanation
for this had to do with the use of the undetermined category for Navy
personnel who died by drowning from a ship (“overboards”), despite the
fact that some portion of overboards are likely suicides. Once these
undetermined deaths were added to the suicides, rates were found to be
identical across services. This demonstrated how differences in the
classification of deaths can account for apparent differences in rates of
suicide across military services.
· Veteran suicides may be more likely to be correctly classified as
suicides than suicides occurring in non-veterans because of the
availability of more accurate information to complete the death
certificate. Veterans may as a whole actually have greater access to high
quality health care and better family support than demographically matched
non-veteran samples. Thus, there may be more information available to
coroners and funeral directors when completing death certificates, making
it less likely that deaths will be classified as an undetermined cause
(and hence more likely that suicides will be correctly classified) in
veterans than in non-veterans.
· There may also be implicit societal beliefs (e.g., that veterans are at
higher risk of suicide) that bias the determination of death, which for
suicide involves the subjective assessment of whether or not there was
intent.
3. There may be unadjusted demographic differences or differences across
years. There are large differences in rates of suicide by race/ethnicity,
but much of the data comparing veterans and general populations only
adjust for gender and age. A higher proportion of veterans (81.9 percent
vs. 67.6 percent) are white-non-Hispanic individuals than in the general
population (US Census Bureau, n.d.), and this may increase the apparent
differences between veterans and non-veterans since suicide rates are
higher in whites. There are also somewhat confusing data regarding age,
with NVDRS showing that the highest risk in veterans is in the youngest
age group, and Dr. Kaplan’s data indicating that the highest risk is in
the older age group. Again, the lack of consistency suggests that there
are biases that have not been sufficiently evaluated.
RECOMMENDATION 1:
VHA should establish an analysis and research plan in collaboration with
other Federal agencies to resolve conflicting study results in order to
ensure that there is a consistent approach to describing the rates of
suicide and suicide attempts in veterans.
This is necessary to inform both the public and VA itself about progress
in suicide prevention. It is recommended that VA commission an outside
group of experts (such as the Institute of Medicine or other highly
respected independent scientific organization) to assist in reconciling
the data already gathered, as well as to help plan future surveillance
efforts by a variety of entities (e.g., Federal agencies, states,
deployment bases) that would implement the use of uniform definitions
(such as those being developed by the CDC). This would also facilitate
surveillance efforts that cut across other systems of interest (e.g.,
emergency departments, criminal justice settings, state Medicaid
services). The CDC is currently working to achieve more uniform state and
local suicide death and suicide attempt reporting, and VA’s involvement in
this activity would be of great benefit.
The Work Group considered a number of specific areas where surveillance
and epidemiological research could be improved. Studies that compare rates
of suicide between veteran and non-veteran populations should ensure that
undetermined deaths are examined (along with, if possible, accidental
causes of death). Any higher rate of undetermined deaths (or accidental
deaths) in non-veterans that counterbalances higher rates of suicide in
veterans requires explanation. Studies that compare veteran and
non-veteran populations should also include analysis of self-injurious
behavior without regard to intent in order to determine if trends based on
officially classified suicides are consistent with data for all
self-injurious deaths or behaviors.
Demographically adjusted comparisons between veteran and non-veteran
populations should include race/ethnicity, in addition to age and gender.
Additionally, a detailed analysis is needed of how veteran status is
ascertained on available sources of data used in rate calculations, as
well as an assessment of any biases that may result from differences in
ascertainment. Studies should clearly delineate the total veteran
population and the veteran population eligible for VA benefits. Studies
should assess the proportion of the veteran population that was only in
service for a short time period and were discharged due to problems such
as misconduct, personality disorders, substance use disorders, and other
administrative reasons that may put them at uniquely high risk for suicide
compared with those who remained in service.
Studies may need to link multiple data sets (e.g., VA, Department of
Defense [DoD], NVDRS, and NDI data) to accurately compile VHA treatment
history, service characteristics, and death circumstances. The NDVRS,
which currently functions across 16 states and in four counties in
California, has demonstrated the value of a more consistent approach to
defining suicide deaths, as well as compiling information on veteran
decedents who may have received care across multiple systems. Linking
NVDRS data with VA and DoD data has the potential to address the
ascertainment and misclassification biases mentioned previously. The NVDRS
would be able to better serve VA and the nation by expanding to all
states, and evaluation of the potential advantages of this (e.g.
geographic mapping) should be included in the review and recommendations
for uniform approaches to defining veteran status.
FINDING 2: Suicide screening processes being implemented in VHA primary
care clinics go beyond the current evidence and may have unintended
effects.
The initiative in VA’s Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives for
Suicide Prevention that will touch the greatest number of veterans is
depression and PTSD screening of all veterans in primary care on a
periodic basis, coupled with mandatory assessment for suicide risk for
those veterans who screen positive (i.e., at higher risk). Currently,
suicide assessments must be completed for any veteran who screens positive
on the PHQ-2, PHQ-9, or PCL, even if the clinician’s evaluation does not
support a diagnosis of depression or PTSD or the suicide ideation question
on the PHQ-9 is not endorsed. Cutoff criteria for the PHQ-2, PHQ-9, and
PCL are all set at a low cut-point (high sensitivity), which results in
low specificity, low positive predictive value (even in a primary care
setting), and a high rate of false positive results (see Terhakopian,
Sinaii, Engel, Schnurr, & Hoge, 2008, for further discussion on population
screening). This approach to screening for depression and PTSD is
reasonable in primary care settings, as the initial positive screen is
followed by an interview with the primary care with additional questions
about depression and PTSD to determine if treatment (or referral) is
necessary for these conditions. However, the new mandatory requirement to
also assess all veterans who screen positive on the initial screen for
suicide risk has not been validated in an evidence-based manner. Because
of the lack of sufficient evidence, all of the experts who presented to
the Work Group clearly stated that they did not at this time endorse
routine mandatory screening for suicide in non-mental health settings.
Although it is logical that veterans diagnosed with PTSD or depression
should be assessed for suicide risk in some manner, it is not reasonable
that all veterans who screen positive for these conditions on the
preliminary screen (which will include a large number of false positives)
should undergo a complete suicide risk assessment. Even those diagnosed
with depression or PTSD do not necessarily require a formal suicide
assessment with a standardized assessment instrument. The current approach
will likely result in a large percentage of veterans being required to
undergo suicide risk assessments who in fact do not have depression or
PTSD or a need for such an assessment.
The Work Group was informed that there are currently no specific
instructions from VA’s Office of Mental Health Services regarding how
facilities are supposed to conduct these suicide risk assessments.
Consequently, it is likely that this mandatory requirement will be
implemented in a variety of ways across the system, with markedly variable
results. Some primary care clinicians (or nurses in primary care) may be
perfectly comfortable doing a quick assessment using the pocket card
included in training packages. However, the term “suicide risk assessment”
implies a formal structured process, and thus it is likely that many
facilities will mandate the use of standardized suicide risk assessments
that take a considerable amount of time to administer (e.g., the Columbia
Suicide Severity Rating Scale). Some facilities may refer all patients who
screen positive for depression or PTSD to mental health due to this new
requirement if they consider mental health professionals to be the only
professionals qualified to formally conduct such an assessment. It is not
known if the number of new mental health professionals being incorporated
into primary care clinics will be sufficient to conduct these suicide risk
assessments, or how many referrals to specialty mental health services
will result. Furthermore, it is not known if the SPCs will have to be
notified of persons found to have some level of suicidal ideation (even if
very low risk) through these processes.
This screening process, as designed, affects a large number of veterans,
is time consuming, potentially stigmatizing, likely to be variable in
implementation, and not evidence-based, and may result in unnecessary
referrals to specialty mental health services. This is not in concert with
evidence-based collaborative primary care models, such as those described
by Dr. Martha Bruce in her presentation to the Work Group.
It should be noted that the Work Group only had time to review the
materials provided by the Office of Mental Health Services leadership and
did not conduct any interviews directly with professionals working in
primary care or mental health clinics to determine how acceptable the new
policies are to clinicians and patients. However, Dr. Jobes, in his
presentation to the Work Group on disseminating assessments and
psychosocial interventions, noted that he had received feedback from VHA
mental health clinicians regarding concerns about treating veterans with
suicidal ideation and behaviors. VA should systematically explore these
concerns, obtaining feedback from both primary care and mental health
clinicians. Ensuring the “buy in” of the clinicians who will need to
implement VA suicide prevention initiatives will increase the likelihood
that these efforts will be successful. The implementation of the screening
processes as outlined above will need to be evaluated thoroughly to ensure
that primary care clinicians as well as patients respond positively and
effectively to these initiatives.
RECOMMENDATION 2:
VA should revise and reevaluate the current policies regarding mandatory
suicide screening assessments.
Screening for depression and PTSD should continue in primary care, and the
PHQ-2, PHQ-9, and PCL are reasonable instruments with which to do this.
However, a formal suicide assessment for all patients who screen positive
at this initial step should not be mandatory. Rather, after the initial
screening with PHQ-2, PHQ-9, or PCL, it is important for a clinician to
first confirm that the initial screen is a true positive for depression or
PTSD by evaluating the patient. Patients who screen positive for
depression or PTSD should be asked about suicidal ideation. Clinicians
should verify that any positive response to question 9 of the PHQ
(including those not otherwise positive for depression or PTSD) does
indeed reflect the presence of suicidal ideation, since this question is
also very general. If suicidal ideation or recent suicidal behavior is
present, then the clinician should be required to proceed with further
clinical evaluation and documentation.
Guidance that is broad enough to encompass the current standard of
clinical practice, both in primary care and specialty mental health care,
should be provided to facilities to clarify the various ways to
appropriately evaluate and document suicide risk. The term “assessment”
should generally be reserved for structured risk assessments. It should be
clarified that the evaluation by the clinician does not have to involve
the use of a structured instrument. Structured suicide assessment
instruments should be available as a resource to clinicians, but any
mandatory requirement to use them should be specifically guided by
evidence-based studies or program evaluations. Program evaluation should
be conducted to assess the impact on primary care, mental health
professionals, and patients, and to encourage candid and open feedback
from professionals working in these clinics about these new policies.
Collaborative care approaches for the management of depression and PTSD
within primary care should continue to be encouraged.
FINDING 3. VA is attempting to systematically provide coordinated,
intensive, enhanced care to veterans identified as being at high risk for
suicide. However, the criteria for being flagged as high risk is not
clearly delineated; nor are criteria for being removed from the high risk
list.
Because transitions across care settings are known to be high risk periods
for suicidal behavior, many health providers and care systems struggle to
find ways to improve continuity of care and to maintain quality of care
during these periods. VHA, through its own root cause analyses, has
identified communication deficiencies, such as the communication and
documentation of risk, as the single largest potential root cause category
associated with suicidal behavior; similar results have been found by The
Joint Commission in looking at deaths by suicide in inpatient facilities
(see http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/). VHA’s plans to
“flag” individuals assessed for risk for suicidal behavior “within VISN”
electronic medical records is a bold step to improve communication about a
patient’s risk status. As planned, this Category II flag would travel
across care settings with a patient’s consent, but would not be
“universal” in the electronic medical record to which providers might have
national access. Planned safeguards for this Category II flag include
requiring the patient’s consent to include the flag in the medical record,
and removing the flag as the patient’s condition improves.
As described in an April 24th memorandum to VISN directors from VA
Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Health and the Deputy Under Secretary
for Health for Operations and Management, placement on the high risk list
is associated with a set of requirements that represents current best
practices in suicide prevention. These include requiring careful follow-up
by a provider during the high-risk period after inpatient discharge,
following up after missed appointments, involving family or friends in
treatment, developing a written safety plan, and utilizing a mail program
to keep in contact with veterans at risk. Implementation of such
requirements may help prevent suicides, but evaluation will be critical to
determine this. As this ambitious effort is a work in progress, continuous
quality improvement efforts are essential.
The Category II flag and the “high risk list” are two closely related, but
not identical initiatives. Coordination between these two efforts should
be a priority to minimize potential confusion among providers.
A potential unintended consequence pertaining to the flag is that being
labeled as “high risk” for suicide within a medical facility may be
stigmatizing to patients. This could be compounded if a suicide flag
becomes visible to facilities on a national level, as there are plans to
add a suicide designator to the Category I risk flag now reserved only for
violent patients. Alternate labels for such flags could be developed, such
as “high interest,” although these labels could also be stigmatizing
RECOMMENDATION 3: Proceed with the planned implementation of the Category
II flag, with consideration given to pilot testing the flag in one or more
regions before full national implementation.
In implementing the Category II flag, VA should ensure that clear
guidelines are disseminated for notifying the SPCs regarding use of both
the high risk list and the Category II flag. The Category I flag should
not be used for suicide risk until an evaluation of the current use of the
high risk list and the Category II flag has taken place and supports the
need for a Category I flag.
Program evaluation of the SPC notification and high risk flag process and
outcomes should be conducted, and the program modified accordingly based
on feedback from primary care, mental health professionals, and SPCs in
combination with documented outcomes. Additionally, patient reactions to
being placed on the high risk (or “high interest”) list should be
assessed, along with potential stigma.
FINDING 4. The root cause analyses presented to the Work Group did not
distinguish between suicide deaths, suicide attempts, and self-harming
behavior without intent to die.
The root cause analyses now being conducted in VA represent one of the
most comprehensive efforts ever undertaken to examine potential systems
issues that may play a role in suicide attempts or deaths by suicide. For
this reason, information emerging from this initiative is of great
potential value. However, to improve the value and comparability of these
data it is necessary to evaluate data from completed suicides and suicide
attempts separately.
RECOMMENDATION 4: Ensure that suicides and suicide attempts that are
reported from root cause analyses use definitions consistent with broader
VHA surveillance efforts.
The suicide deaths and attempts reviewed in root cause analyses should be
defined in a manner consistent with broader VA suicide surveillance
efforts, which optimally will be consistent with CDC definitions (see
Recommendation 1).
VHA, as the country’s largest health care system, offers a tremendous
opportunity to work with The Joint Commission to increase knowledge about
suicide prevention through root cause analyses. Periodic reports that
summarize findings from these analyses should be prepared and shared with
clinicians for quality improvement. It is common in mental health systems
of all types for clinicians to view root cause analyses of deaths by
suicide with great concern. It is essential that the processes used both
to conduct the root cause analyses and to utilize the information to
improve systems be kept separate from any type of disciplinary
proceedings. The root cause analyses reports should thus make clear that
the purpose of these reviews is to improve systems, not blame individuals.
FINDING 5. The emphasis of VHA leadership on the use of clozapine and
lithium does not appear to be sufficiently evidence-based.
VHA leadership has specifically emphasized the value of clozapine and
lithium as modalities with evidence in preventing suicide (e.g. internal
VA memo to VISN directors, April 24, 2008). This command-level emphasis
does not appear to have a sufficient body of evidence, and there are
serious side effects associated with clozapine and lithium that newer
atypical antipsychotics approved for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder do
not have.
RECOMMENDATION 5: VHA should ensure that specific pharmacotherapy
recommendations related to suicide or suicide behaviors are
evidence-based.
VHA has the opportunity to test the potential effectiveness of clozapine,
lithium, and other pharmacotherapies for alleviating symptoms of
conditions associated with increased suicide risk and for which such
medications are indicated. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)
are likely to reduce depression and anxiety symptoms, and there is
mounting evidence that there is no increased risk of iatrogenic
suicidality in adults taking them. Thus, there is no indication for VHA to
in any way restrict use of SSRIs on the basis of concerns about inducing
suicidality when prescribed as indicated for the treatment of mental
health disorders. With its large population of veterans served, VA is
encouraged to continue its research examining the safety and efficacy of
SSRI pharmacotherapy for depression and anxiety disorders where systematic
assessment of suicidality could further inform treatment course and
outcomes.
FINDING 6: Efforts to improve accurate media coverage and disseminate
universal messages to shift normative behaviors to reduce population
suicide risk behavior are not being fully pursued.
As noted under the problems in VA suicide surveillance, current media
coverage focused on numerators and undefined cohorts has resulted in
unintended messages that could potentially discourage eligible veterans
from seeking needed services. With regard to efforts to reduce the risk of
suicide for the broader population of veterans that would likely involve
media outreach, the Work Group was concerned about the apparent
restrictions on VA against “advertising” its services.
RECOMMENDATION 6: VA should continue to pursue opportunities for outreach
to enrolled and eligible veterans, and to disseminate messages to reduce
risk behavior associated with suicidality.
Positive social norming and marketing are potentially potent interventions
to enhance the quality of care by providers, as well as to improve
veterans’ health behaviors. Thus, VA restrictions on advertising or social
marketing its available services should be clarified and barriers to such
advertising removed. Although family members of veterans are often
encouraged to promote veteran health behaviors in Vet Center settings, it
is less clear to what degree Congressional authorizations allow VA medical
centers and other VHA facilities to provide outreach to family members in
order to facilitate access to care by veterans. Such outreach to families
would be beneficial.
FINDING 7. Concerns about confidentiality for OIF/OEF service members
treated at VHA facilities may represent a barrier to mental health care.
There was a concern raised during the meeting that policies pertaining to
confidentiality for OEF/OIF military service members (i.e., Reserve and
Guard) while receiving care at VHA facilities may represent a barrier to
needed mental health care. When asked about current policies, VHA
representatives who were present at the meeting were unable to provide an
answer at that time or in a subsequent email query, suggesting that other
clinicians working throughout VHA might also not have a ready answer to
this question if asked by one of their patients. It is unclear whether any
policy for providers within VHA clearly articulates the parameters of
confidentiality for Reserve and Guard service members. This lack of
clarity can be a significant potential barrier to the mental health care
of Reserve and Guard service members.
Clinicians in DoD facilities, who constantly balance patient
confidentiality with a Commander’s need to know specific medical
information pertaining to fitness for duty, may be more comfortable with
their dual clinical and occupational medicine roles than VA clinicians,
who may not be familiar with service members’ obligation to inform their
unit when unable to fully perform their duties due to a medical or mental
health condition.
Within DoD, military Commanders receive limited information pertaining to
fitness for duty. Information is conveyed by the medical professional to
the Commander using a mechanism such as a one-page profile that lists duty
restrictions and the duration of such restrictions. In some cases, a
command-directed evaluation may be requested by a Commander when a member
is performing poorly or appears to be at risk to him/herself or to others.
A formal response to the Commander is provided by the mental health
provider(s) conducting the evaluation that lists the member’s diagnoses
(if applicable), the recommended treatment in general terms, and any duty
restrictions or recommendations for administrative separation or medical
evaluation board. For security evaluations, mental health professionals
are frequently asked to judge whether there is any concern that the
condition could impair judgment or affect the service member’s ability to
safeguard security, what the prognosis is, and whether there is compliance
with treatment. Commanders are not provided medical records or other more
detailed information such as mental health process notes, medication
lists, or any other information that they do not have a specific need to
know.
RECOMMENDATION 7. The issue of confidentiality of health records of
OEF/OIF service members who receive care through VHA should be clarified
both for patient consent-to-care and for general dissemination to Reserve
and Guard service members contemplating utilizing VHA medical system
services to which they are entitled.
Dissemination and implementation of such policies should also be clarified
for VHA providers. OEF/OIF service members who receive care in VHA should
be guaranteed the same balanced level of confidentiality that they receive
at military treatment facilities within DoD. VHA clinicians need to
clearly understand what type of information a military Commander is
entitled to receive from VHA through the unit’s medics; this will ensure
that they provide a consistent message to OEF/OIF Reserve Component
service members that is both informative and reassuring.
FINDING 8. The introduction of Suicide Prevention Coordinators (SPCs) at
each VA medical center is a major innovation that holds great promise for
preventing suicide among veterans; however, there is insufficient
information on optimal staffing levels of SPCs.
The introduction of Suicide Prevention Coordinators at each VA medical
center is a major innovation that holds great promise for preventing
suicide among veterans. The link between the SPCs and the veterans suicide
prevention hotline, which connects callers to mental health providers at
VA’s Center of Excellence at Canandaigua, represents the most extensive
national effort to connect suicide hotline callers with appropriate care.
Although no staffing model for SPCs was presented at the meeting, the fact
that there is currently only one SPC at each VHA facility—regardless of
the number of veterans served—and that this may limit the effectiveness of
the program, was discussed.
SPCs are responsible for promoting awareness, conducting community
outreach, training providers and guides, flagging high risk patients,
conducting individual case management, and developing local suicide
prevention strategies. VHA staff reported that an informal verbal survey
of SPCs indicated that they felt they could effectively manage a community
of up to 20,000 patients. However, some SPCs are currently attempting to
case manage up to 150 high risk patients, which precludes them from
fulfilling other SPC roles. Specifically, the ability of SPCs to do
community outreach may be impaired by the magnitude of their other
responsibilities. Staffing may need to be increased to allow for this
function to be adequately performed, in keeping with the requirement in
the Joshua Omvig Veterans Suicide Prevention Act (P.L. 110-110) that the
SPCs “work with local emergency rooms, police departments, mental health
organizations, and veterans service organizations to engage in outreach to
veterans and improve the coordination of mental health care to veterans.”
These SPC functions are likely vital for successful outreach to veterans
in high risk settings such as emergency departments or in the justice
system.
RECOMMENDATION 8. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the Suicide
Prevention Coordinators program, it is recommended that there be ongoing
evaluation of the roles and workloads of the SPC positions.
Findings from these evaluations should be used to optimize VHA staffing
requirements (including for the larger community-based outpatient
clinics), as well as for meeting the community outreach requirements of
the Joshua Omvig Veterans Suicide Prevention Act. In order to meet these
requirements, larger VA medical centers may need to expand the single
staff SPC model to one that has sufficient capacity to meet the outreach
and care management requirements (e.g., a Suicide Prevention Team). VHA is
also encouraged to evaluate the impact of the SPCs in enhancing risk
communication and improving continuity of care.
Other Considerations
The Work Group also identified a number of additional recommendations that
do not fit into the above categories.
1. Adopt a standard nomenclature/definition for suicide and suicide
attempt that is consistent with other federal organizations, such as the
CDC, and the scientific community.
2. Prepare a single document that details the comprehensive suicide
prevention strategic plan outlined to the Work Group in different briefs
and documents in order to facilitate more efficient review of suicide
prevention progress.
3. VHA framework for suicide prevention should consider a public health
approach that goes beyond secondary and tertiary prevention. Current
interventions focus on veterans exhibiting some form of destructive
behavior, suicidal self-disclosure, or a positive depression or PTSD
screen. In their presentations, Drs. Ten Have and Caine recommended a VHA
and DoD population-level culture change that includes a public health
framework in addition to an etiologic focus on the growing heterogeneous
military and veteran populations. VA could explore ways to strengthen
resilience and build connectedness in the military and veteran communities
and their families as a universal prevention approach, and then more
effectively target selective and indicated groups with higher levels of
risk.
4. The portfolio for suicide research across VHA should be expanded, with
suicide prevention prioritized as a research area. Top priorities for
research may include clinical trials of therapeutic modalities (e.g.
cognitive-behavioral therapy), primary care interventions, effectiveness
studies and program evaluations to determine the clinical utility and
risk/cost/benefit relationships of new policies and interventions,
epidemiological studies to resolve conflicting results, and validation of
suicide screening instruments. As the SPCs are now identifying large
numbers of veterans who are attempting suicide each month, and since we
know that suicide attempts are the single most powerful predictor of death
by suicide, VA should consider supporting multisite research focused on
reducing long-term mortality and morbidity in this population—and in
particular on reducing death by suicide and suicide re-attempts.
Importantly, the collection of timely information on suicide attempt
status also allows for dynamic surveillance of suicide prevention efforts.
Such a multisite study, which would be very difficult to conduct in a
setting other than VHA, would be of immense value, potentially yielding
significant applications for the nation’s health care system as a whole.
This knowledge could also benefit veterans who do not access VHA services,
but are seen in community hospitals and other settings across the country.
5. Consider establishing an Advisory Board of key VHA stakeholders
involved in suicide prevention, education, treatment, and research to
monitor and evaluate suicide programs and policies on an ongoing basis,
establish research priorities, and provide advice to senior VHA leadership
on existing and new initiatives.
6. VA’s efforts to reach out to community emergency departments to improve
care for active service and veterans at risk for suicidal behavior are
encouraged. VA should move forward with plans to work collaboratively with
other Federal agencies and with community hospitals to identify veterans
in non-VA emergency departments (EDs). Research has demonstrated that
those who attempt suicide and are evaluated in EDs have both high rates of
suicide and low rates of follow-up with outpatient services following ED
discharge. Development of evidence-based interventions that can be used
with veterans in both VA and community EDs should be a priority.
7. VA should continue its efforts to promote training in implementing
suicide prevention programs. Current training efforts are two pronged:
Training of health care professionals designed to enhance competencies in
suicide risk assessment, management, and treatment, and “guide” or
gatekeeper training designed to train the non-clinical VA workforce on how
to recognize and respond to warning signs of suicide. These training
efforts should be complemented with the training of researchers in the
skills necessary to evaluate the impact of clinician training and program
implementation efforts. VA’s program of clinical training in safety
planning is an excellent starting point for education efforts, but
continuing education in suicide risk assessment, management, and treatment
should be an ongoing effort, improved by research on and evaluation of
clinician training, practice implementation, and patient outcomes.
8. Promising follow-up interventions designed to prevent veterans
identified as being at risk from “falling through the cracks” should be
evaluated and, if deemed effective, implemented further. One example of
such an intervention is the use of caring letters based on the studies by
Jerome Motto and Gregory Carter (e.g., Motto & Bostrom, 2001; Carter,
Clover, Whyte, Dawson, & D’Este, 2005) to maintain contact with veterans
who have been identified as being at high risk. Another effort involves
making follow-up calls to veterans who accessed the veterans hotline but
did not accept linkage to a SPC.
9. VA should work collaboratively with other federal agencies to
understand and evaluate the implications of new technologies for suicide
prevention (e.g. social networking, text messaging, etc).
10. VA should design and disseminate psychoeducation materials for
families of veterans who are at risk for suicide, particularly those
hospitalized for suicide attempts.
11. For veterans who exhibit chronic suicidal behavior, and who do not
respond to short-term therapies, more intensive modalities of treatment
should be considered, such as dialectical behavior therapy, intensive case
management, assertive community treatment, or other evidence-based
interventions. Additionally, the evaluation of intensive outpatient
alternatives to hospitalization should be promoted.
12. VA should review approaches for better integrating VA chaplaincy and
pastoral care services and traditional mental health services. Care should
be taken to ensure that there is a balance between ensuring
confidentiality in dealing with VHA-entitled service members whose mental
health conditions may be affected by issues associated with combat, and
providing adequate training for clergy to improve their appropriate
referrals for additional assessment and possible treatment. The Work Group
further recommends that VA collaborate with other public and private
partners to reach out to faith-based communities that can assist veterans
at risk.
13. The Work Group recommends that VA implement a gun safety program
directed at veterans with children in the home, both as a child safety
measure and as a suicide prevention effort. Efforts to improve gun safety
through increased use of gun locks can be an important suicide prevention
effort that can be disseminated as part of DoD and VA culture and
practice. The Work Group was pleased that VA is considering implementing
such a program.
14. The Work Group recommends that VA analyze entitlement changes required
to allow treatment of combat-related conditions to reduce suicides in
un-entitled veteran populations. Currently, VA treatment of mental health
and substance use disorders in some combat veterans is not allowed because
the category of their discharge, such as dishonorable discharge.
Congressional authorization to treat some combat conditions in this
population may enhance their outcomes and reduce suicides.
References
Brown, G., Ten Have, T., Henriques, G., Nie, S., Hollander, J., and Beck,
A. (2005). Cognitive therapy for the prevention of suicide attempts: A
randomized controlled trial. JAMA, 294(5), 563-570.
Bullman, T. and Kang, H. (1994). Posttraumatic stress disorder and the
risk of traumatic deaths among Vietnam veterans. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, 182, 604·610.
Bullman, T. and Kang, H. (1996). Risk of suicide among wounded Vietnam
veterans. American Journal of Public Health, 86, 662-667.
Carr, J., Hoge, C., Gardner, J., and Potter, R. (2004). Suicide
surveillance in the U.S. military—Reporting and classification biases in
rate calculations. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 34(3), 233-241.
Carter, G., Clover, K., Whyte, I., Dawson, A., and D’Este, C. (2005).
Postcards from the Edge project: Randomised controlled trial of an
intervention using postcards to reduce repetition of hospital treated
deliberate self poisoning. British Medical Journal, 191, 548-553.
Eaton, K., Messer, S., Wilson, A., and Hoge, C. (2006). Strengthening the
validity of population-based suicide rate comparisons: An illustration
using U.S. military and civilian data. Suicide and Life-Threatening
Behavior, 36(2), 182-191.
Kang H. and Bullman, T. (2001) Mortality among U.S. veterans of the Gulf
War: Seven year follow up. American Journal of Epidemiology, 154, 399-405.
Kaplan, M., Huguet, N., McFarland, B., and Newsom, J. (2007). Suicide
among male veterans: A prospective study. Journal of Epidemiology and
Community Health, 61, 619-624.
Linehan, M., Comtois, K., Murray, A., Brown, M., Gallup, R., Heard, H., et
al. (2006). Two-year randomized controlled trial and follow-up of
dialectical behavior therapy vs. therapy by experts for suicidal behaviors
and borderline personality disorder. Archives of General Psychiatry, 63,
757-766.
Michalek, J., Ketchum, N., and Akhtar, F. (1998). Postservice mortality of
US Air Force veterans occupationally exposed to herbicides in Vietnam:
15-Year Follow-up. American Journal of Epidemiology, 148, 789-792.
Motto, J. and Bostrom, A. (2001). A randomized controlled trial of
postcrisis suicide prevention. Psychiatric Services, 52, 828-833.
Slee, N., Garnefski, N, van der Leeden, R., Arensman, E., and Spinhoven,
P. (2008). Cognitive-behavioural intervention for self-harm: Randomised
controlled trial. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 192, 202-211.
Terhakopian, A., Sinaii, N., Engel, C., Schnurr, P., and Hoge, C. (2008).
Estimating population prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder: An
example using the PTSD Checklist. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 21,
290-300.
VA Office of Inspector General. (2007). Healthcare Inspection:
Implementing VHA’s Mental Health Strategic Plan Initiatives for Suicide
Prevention (Report No. 06-03706-126). Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Census Bureau. (n.d.). United States: S2101. Veterans Status, Data
Set: American Community Survey. Retrieved June 27, 2008, from http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
STTable?_bm=y&-qr_name= ACS_2006_EST_G00_S2101
US Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. (2001).
National Strategy for Suicide Prevention: Goals and Objectives for Action
(Doc SMA 3517). Rockville, MD: Author.
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (2008, May 2). VA Benefits & Health
Care Utilization. http://www1.va.gov/vetdata/docs/4X6_spring08_sharepoint.pdf
Watanabe, K., Kang, H., and Thomas, T. (1991). Mortality among Vietnam
veterans: With methodological considerations. Journal of Occupational
Medicine, 33, 780-785.
[1] Members of the Expert Panel have no significant direct relationship
with the Department of Veterans Affairs.
[2] Universal interventions refer to approaches designed for everyone in a
defined population, regardless of their risk; selective approaches focus
on subgroups that are at increased risk (e.g., patients diagnosed with
depression, PTSD, substance abuse disorders, or chronic pain), and
indicated approaches focus on individuals who have been identified as
being at high risk (USDHHS, 2001).
[3] NVDRS is funded in 17 states; however, data from California are
excluded from the analysis because NVDRS has only been implemented in a
lim
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