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WITH THE LOSS OF ONE LAPTOP... -- Some lessons
from
a former VA general counsel who learned the
hard way.

For more about VA data losses, go to this
page...
http://vawatchdog.org/va%20
data%20theft%20news.htm
Story here...
http://www.law.com/
jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp
?id=1190019773602
Story below:
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With the Loss of One Laptop
Some lessons from a general counsel who learned the hard way
Adam Palmer and Tim S. McClain
Legal Times
If you are an in-house counsel, you probably don't question whether you
will experience a serious data loss at your company, but rather when the
loss will occur. It's pretty clear that the loss of trade secrets,
personal employee data or confidential customer information can cause
serious harm to a company's reputation. It could even lead to civil
litigation if the data loss breaches nondisclosure obligations.
Recent case law has proven just how much of a legal duty companies have
to properly safeguard data. And states have started to pass laws
requiring companies to warn those who may be affected by data security
breaches.
Despite increasing security efforts, the Internet today remains the Wild
West of data security, where employees and their friends often freely
discuss information that may be highly confidential. An even more
elusive threat may be people outside the companies who overhear or
inadvertently learn confidential information. In the wrong hands, this
information can circulate the globe on the Internet in a matter of
hours. For corporate counsel, the importance of understanding the
benefits of a sound data security program has never been greater.
THE FIREWALL APPROACH
A 2006 study of security breaches prepared for Congress by the
Congressional Research Service found that 20 percent of all security
breaches at U.S. medical centers were the result of "employee
malfeasance." Many companies falsely feel secure because they have an
expensive computer firewall or perhaps a "blogging and e-mail" policy.
The reality is that such defenses, while commendable, are really just
scratching the surface of proper data protection. These defenses only
address superficial and unsophisticated threats. They will be nearly
useless against a malicious employee or outside person spreading false
or confidential information about your company across the Internet from
a deliberately obscured Web site. Even the best firewall is not going to
stop the human resources manager who keeps staff data backed up on an
external flash drive connected to her key chain.
An effective anti-blogging policy will have no effect on the neighbor of
a department manager who overhears a confidential phone call and writes
about it on his blog. The examples are endless, but they illustrate the
critical need for a comprehensive approach to data security. A strong
approach recognizes the scope of the company's Internet "footprint," the
various physical forms of data storage, and the need for a quick
reaction program to respond to breaches once they are recognized.
How many companies open a new facility and spend thousands of dollars on
expensive physical security measures but budget only a fraction of that
amount for data security? Recent headlines provide ample evidence of the
danger posed by employee negligence and theft of confidential data. This
summer, Fidelity National Information Services announced that a
senior-level database administrator had stolen the records of millions
of customers and sold them to marketing companies.
Consider, for a moment, your company's response if a similar incident
were to occur. Perhaps a sales manager is stealing client information.
Maybe even a senior executive is disclosing insider information that
might affect the sale of securities. Maybe you consider these to be rare
examples of betrayal by criminal employees.
However, one need only recall the media storm last year over the loss of
information at the Department of Veterans Affairs to understand that
simple employee negligence can be as great a threat as theft. The story
of the VA provides a great example of a good organization that fell
victim to a series of unexpected events resulting in a very serious
loss. The story of the VA and the lessons learned from that crisis are
invaluable for any in-house counsel. During the data loss crisis at the
VA, the co-author of this article, Tim McClain, served as general
counsel of the VA.
WHAT HAPPENED AT THE VA
Consider how you would handle one of your worst nightmares. You receive
a call early in the morning and are told that the personal information
of 26.5 million of your customers has been lost and potentially
compromised. What do you do? Whom do you call, and how do you discover
the cause?
While the details described here are all a matter of public record,
appearing in many investigative reports and transcripts of congressional
hearings, a few facts may not be well-known. It's important to remember
that the stolen laptop was a personal laptop, not a VA or government
computer; all of the lost data were on an external hard drive, which was
personally owned; and the only items stolen from the owner's home were
the laptop, the external hard drive and some pocket change.
The employee involved in the VA laptop loss had 34 years of exemplary
federal service and was a Harvard-trained Ph.D. statistician. His job
involved statistical analysis and working with very large databases, and
he had access to huge amounts of personal information. He used that
access to perform sophisticated analysis of trends and provide forecasts
to assist in planning. Over the course of several months he downloaded
portions of the data onto CDs and DVDs, carried them home, and loaded
them on his personal hard drive for a special project that he was
working on with the hope that it would ultimately benefit the VA.
The employee's residence was burglarized on May 3, 2006. The laptop and
hard drive were not password-protected. The employee immediately
reported the loss to his supervisor and the VA security office that same
evening. He also reported the fact that the hard drive contained a lot
of personal information. The secretary of Veterans Affairs was not
notified of the loss until May 16 -- 13 days later. The public was not
notified of the loss until May 22. Why?
The main reasons for the delay were the lack of a written policy for
response to a data loss or breach and a lack of urgency on the part of
supervisory personnel in determining the scope of the loss. Although the
employee's supervisor interviewed him the morning following the
burglary, the supervisor did not ascertain the scope of the loss and did
not notify his own superiors of the loss.
The extent of the loss was not fully realized until investigators from
the VA Inspector General's Office interviewed the employee. They
immediately notified the VA chief of staff of the potential magnitude of
the loss. The chief of staff formed an ad hoc crisis response team to
handle the situation and notified the secretary of Veterans Affairs of
the loss.
Significant problems with the case were immediately identified. First,
the employee had no firm idea exactly what information was on the hard
drive, how many people it might affect, and whether the data contained
medical information protected by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. Second, the department did not have current
addresses on the millions of veterans, dependents and active-duty
military personnel whose personal information was on the hard drive.
There was no established crisis response plan or crisis communications
plan.
The hard drive was recovered through some excellent police work, and it
was later determined that no one had accessed the data. Investigators
determined that none of the information had been used for criminal
purposes, especially identity theft. So how did the laptop incident
affect a federal agency as large as the VA when there was no hacking, no
inside criminal activity, and no identity theft? It consumed senior
management and paralyzed the department for many weeks.
LEARN THESE LESSONS
The lessons to be learned from the VA incident and various other
government agency incidents were listed in a Government Accountability
Office report, released this April, called "Privacy -- Lessons Learned
About Data Breach Notification." The lessons apply equally to every
company and include the following points:
• Rapid internal notification of key senior company or government
officials is critical.
• A core group of senior officials should be designated to make
decisions regarding the appropriate response.
• Mechanisms must be in place to obtain contact information for affected
individuals. (If your company or federal agency maintains a database
with personal information, for instance, ask your privacy and
information professionals if they have current addresses for everyone in
that database.)
• Determining when to offer credit monitoring or other services to
affected individuals requires risk-based management decisions.
• Interaction with the public requires careful coordination and can be
resource-intensive.
• Internal training and awareness are critical to a timely response,
including notification.
• Contractors to your company or agency should have their obligations if
they experience a data breach clearly defined.
The need for increased vigilance with data protection is increasing.
Adding to the importance of action is the pending adoption of Internet
Protocol Version 6. Internet protocol is the system of addresses that
computers use to identify each other and communicate. It is this system
that supports the entire Internet. For almost 20 years, this system has
been the same and is referred to as Internet Protocol Version 4.
But technology experts have long been calling for an update to IPv4 with
a system that can better handle the massive amounts of Web traffic and
also fully support other needs, such as Wi-Fi and next-generation
wireless services like Wi-Max. Put more simply, IPv4 is a system built
on "telephone numbers" 32 characters long. As the Web grows and starts
to run out of numbers, it eventually needs a new system. IPv6 uses
128-character numbers and provides a vast upgrade in capacity. While
there are many other significant features of IPv6, at its core it
represents an expansion of the number of potential Internet addresses.
Federal regulations now require that all government agencies be
IPv6-compliant by mid-2008. For government contractors and others
working with the government, IPv6 compatibility is critical. The
capacity advantage for IPv6 is significant, but the new system also
creates an increased need for security measures. As more data are
transmitted or stored on the Internet, the need for data security
awareness only increases.
Added to this concern is the increasing movement towards Web-based
versions of familiar spreadsheet, document production and presentation
programs. Although business benefits by having access to information
from virtually any computer, with such flexibility comes new concerns
about the transmission and security of data.
The Internet is a vast data field and, best practices for data security
require much more than just a good firewall, a blogging policy, or the
occasional check of an employee's MySpace page. Threats exist in both
the physical and digital security of data. The VA case study is also a
good example of how unforeseen events can cause serious damage to even
the best organizations. True data security probably requires using
outside counsel and other professional resources. Although that may seem
costly, the cost of lost customer trust and corporate reputation are far
greater if data security measures are ignored or inadequate.
Adam Palmer is the general counsel and chief cyber security counsel for
Cyveillance Inc. in Washington, D.C. Tim S. McClain practices privacy,
information security, and federal procurement law in the Washington,
D.C., office of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice. He was general counsel
of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs from 2001 to 2006.
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Larry Scott --